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This article critically analyses a major trade union initiative in the United Kingdom to raise stan-
dards in public contracts for domiciliary care, and in turn to improve wages and working conditions
for outsourced care workers. The campaign successfully built alliances with national employer
representatives, and around 25 per cent of commissioning bodies in England, Scotland and Wales
have signed a voluntary charter that guarantees workers an hourly living wage, payment for travel
time and regular working hours. The campaign overall, however, has had only limited effects on
standards across the sector, in which low wages, zero-hours contracts and weak career paths
predominate. Furthermore, the campaign has not yet yielded significant gains in terms of union
recruitment, although there are signs of sporadic mobilisations of care workers in response to
localised disputes.
Résumé
Cet article propose une analyse critique d’une grande campagne syndicale menée au Royaume-Uni
et visant à relever les normes des contrats publics pour les soins à domicile et, par là même, à
améliorer les salaires et les conditions de travail des travailleurs des services de soins externalisés.
La campagne a permis de constituer des alliances avec les représentants des employeurs nationaux,
et environ 25% des organismes de commissionnement en Angleterre, en Écosse et au Pays de
Galles ont signé une charte volontaire qui garantit aux travailleurs un salaire horaire corre-
spondant au minimum vital, le paiement de leur temps de déplacement et des horaires de travail
réguliers. Toutefois, la campagne n’a eu dans l’ensemble que des effets limités sur les normes du
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secteur, caractérisées essentiellement par des bas salaires, des contrats zéro heure et des per-
spectives de carrière médiocres. En outre, la campagne n’a pas encore permis d’engranger des
résultats significatifs en termes de recrutement syndical, même si l’on peut observer certaines
mobilisations sporadiques du personnel soignant à la suite de conflits localisés.
Zusammenfassung
Der vorliegende Artikel ist eine kritische Analyse der breit angelegten Gewerkschaftsinitiative im
Vereinigten Königreich zur Anhebung der Standards bei öffentlichen Aufträgen im Bereich der
häuslichen Pflege, durch die Löhne und Arbeitsbedingungen des Personals privater Pflegeanbieter
verbessert werden sollen. Die Kampagne hat erfolgreich Bündnisse mit nationalen Arbeitgeber-
organisationen geschlossen, und ca. 25 Prozent der für die Auftragsvergabe zuständigen Stellen in
England, Schottland und Wales haben bereits eine freiwillige Charta unterzeichnet, die den
Arbeitnehmer:innen einen existenzsichernden Stundenlohn, die Vergütung der Fahrzeit als
bezahlte Arbeitszeit und reguläre Arbeitszeiten zusichert. Die Kampagne hatte allerdings insge-
samt nur begrenzte Auswirkungen auf die in der Branche herrschenden Zustände mit ihren
typischen Niedriglöhnen, Nullstundenverträgen und bescheidenen beruflichen Perspektiven.
Darüber hinaus hat die Kampagne bisher noch keinen signifikanten Zulauf an neuen Gewerk-
schaftsmitgliedern bewirkt, obwohl es Hinweise auf sporadische Mobilisierungen von Pflege-
personal als Reaktion auf lokal begrenzte Konflikte gibt.
Keywords
Domiciliary care, living wages, precarious work, public procurement, trade unions, worker
mobilisation
Introduction
In response to the longstanding difficulties of organising and mobilising precarious workers in
liberal economic market contexts, trade unions have adopted increasingly pragmatic strategies
aimed at delivering tangible outcomes for workers, with or without concomitant increases in union
membership. Recent studies show how trade unions in the United Kingdom and the United States
have built living wage coalitions with community and faith groups that focus mainly on un-
unionised workers in deprived urban areas (Bunyan, 2016; Luce, 2004). Unions have also worked
with employers and Non Government Organisations (NGOs) to develop voluntary codes of con-
duct that promote sustainable and ethical business practices (Gold et al., 2020). In the United
Kingdom, a number of trade unions have also launched legal cases on behalf of non-members, such
as migrant workers in outsourced services (Wynn-Evans, 2021) and bogus self-employed workers
in the gig economy (Moore and Newsome, 2018).
On the one hand, the emergence of such innovations repudiates claims that trade unions
reinforce labour market dualism by protecting insiders at the expense of peripheral workers (Palier
and Thelen, 2010). On the other hand, as we explore, the use of largely non-confrontational tactics
to challenge injustice and win concessions may detract from longer-term capacity building. These
tensions and trade-offs pose questions for theories of how union renewal and collective worker
action can be achieved (Holgate et al., 2018; Kelly, 1998).
In this article we critically evaluate an innovative and multi-faceted campaign in the United
Kingdom led by the largest public sector trade union, UNISON, which focused on improving the
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pay and working conditions of domiciliary care workers, the majority of whom are employed by
private sector providers working under contract to local (municipal) authorities. In order to eval-
uate the progress of the campaign launched in 2012, we draw on interview data gathered as part of
a larger project on precarious work (2015–2016), the insights of a national trade union organiser
working on the campaign, and also secondary data on pay and working conditions across the
domiciliary care sector.
The public campaign hinged on building alliances with national employer representative bodies
in order to highlight problems of low pay and precarious work in domiciliary care, and to put
pressure on national government to increase funding. The public campaign was complemented at
local level by tripartite charters signed by local authority commissioners, private sector employers
and trade unions, which offered workers a true living wage and improved terms and conditions, as
well as greater contractual security. In the absence of sustained funding increases across the sector,
however, and with only weak institutional mechanisms with which to leverage ripple and spillover
effects, the gains from the campaign and charter have so far remained highly localised. The
implications for the position of precarious workers in the domiciliary care sector, as well as the
future of organising and capacity building, are discussed below.
Organising and mobilising precarious workers
Trade unions across Europe face significant challenges in respect of representing and securing
positive outcomes for precarious workers. Falling membership density and declining collective
bargaining coverage have weakened the unions’ institutional power and legitimacy, and the steady
erosion of so-called ‘standard employment relationships’ over the past 30 years has arguably
undermined the recruitment of new members (Carver and Doellgast, 2020; Holgate et al., 2018).
For some, the appropriate response is to find ways to mobilise precarious workers around
perceived injustices at work, and to support them in collective action in pursuit of redress (Kelly,
1998; López-Andreu, 2020). The success of this approach in securing concessions from employers,
while also building solidarity and bargaining power, hinges on three elements. The first is the
effective framing and articulation of grievances at work (often by union leaders), while the second
is attributing the blame for these grievances to an identifiable other, usually the employer or
management. The third and final element is to develop a sense of collective efficacy, that is, a
belief that acting collectively will rectify their grievances (Kelly, 1998). While these three con-
ditions are not sufficient, they have been argued to be necessary for workers to take action in the
form of strikes, overtime bans or go-slows in order to put pressure on employers (Badigannavar
and Kelly, 2005). Although such mobilisations may be short-term and goal-oriented, the process of
actually participating in collective action can foster lasting solidarity as the divergent interests of
workers and management are laid bare (López-Andreu, 2020). Trade unions may also recruit
members following industrial action, either because employees are seeking individual insurance
against future disputes or because they have developed a heightened appreciation of union effec-
tiveness (Hodder et al., 2017).
Nevertheless, precarious workers’ limited structural power and the fear of counter-mobilisation
on the part of employers have proven to be significant barriers to mobilisation in low paying
sectors, such as cleaning and elder care (Crosby, 2009; Murphy and Turner, 2014). The fragmen-
tation of collective bargaining as a result of outsourcing weakens worker voice, and it may be
difficult for workers to identify a counterpart against whom they can mobilise: should it be their
direct employer or the client firm at the head of the supply chain that shapes working conditions
through their purchasing decisions (Connolly et al., 2017; Grimshaw et al., 2015; Rubery, 2015)?
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For others, the challenge is more fundamental and reflects the need to engage successfully in
‘deep’ workplace organising in peripheral sectors in which the workforce is often fragmented and
worker interests are disparate (McAlevey, 2016). In this way, long-term capacity building entails
bringing in a diverse range of new members, rather than simply mobilising existing ones, and
creating spaces for the formation of shared interests and goals among the rank-and-file rather than
simply accepting priorities imposed by leaders (Holgate et al., 2018).
Precarious work in domiciliary care
Domiciliary or home care includes a range of personal care duties, such as helping older people
with washing, dressing and cooking, as well as the administration of medication in a client’s own
home. As demand for services rises, and clients’ medical and support needs – such as dementia –
become more complex, domiciliary care workers are increasingly faced with a broader and deeper
set of responsibilities (Atkinson and Crozier, 2020; Hebson et al., 2015). Despite the significant
size of the domiciliary care sector in England, there are a number of entrenched challenges that
make it difficult terrain for trade unions to organise and mobilise workers. Around 500,000
workers are employed in domiciliary care (compared with around 300,000 in residential care
without nursing) and it is a strongly gendered profession: nearly 85 per cent of the workforce is
female (Skills for Care, 2020). Wages across the sector are low: mean hourly pay for private sector
workers directly delivering care1 in 2020 was £8.97 (€10.42). This was 3 per cent above the
statutory minimum wage of £8.71 (€10.12) for workers aged 25 and over, but 4 per cent lower
than the higher ‘true’ UK living wage of £9.30 (€10.81), which takes into account the cost of
living.2 The majority of domiciliary care workers in the private sector (56 per cent) are engaged on
zero-hours contracts, under which there is no legal obligation between employers and workers to
provide or perform work, resulting in fluctuating earnings from week to week (Skills for Care,
2020).
The intensely personal and emotionally demanding nature of care work can be rewarding, but
tight control of the labour process, including electronic monitoring to demarcate ‘productive’ time,
such as contact with clients, and ‘unproductive’ time, such as travel and other breaks between
appointments, has partly eroded the discretionary effort on which services rely (Atkinson and
Crozier, 2020; Hebson et al., 2015; Moore and Hayes, 2017). There are issues of labour turnover
in the care sector, but the surprisingly high level of job satisfaction that workers report is also
strongly influenced by alternative opportunities which, particularly for women, may be other low-
paid and precarious work in cleaning, catering and retail (Hebson et al., 2015). This in turn
reinforces a low sense of entitlement to higher wages, an issue that is compounded by a perceived
lack of effectiveness in collective action through trade unions (Cox et al., 2007). Many local
authority care services were outsourced in the 1980s and 1990s, which shifted workers beyond
the scope of collective bargaining agreements. Furthermore, during the 2000s trade unions were
unable to halt the acceleration of outsourcing of care work to avoid the costs associated with the
deserved upgrading of mostly female care workers (Beirne et al., 2019). On top of that, some trade
union branches pressured women workers to accept inferior deals for back pay in order to protect
mostly male manual workers from downgrading (Deakin et al., 2015).
1 Including care workers and senior care workers.
2 The rate calculated by the independent Living Wage Foundation to provide a decent minimum standard of
living; see: https://www.livingwage.org.uk/ (accessed 17 March 2021).
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Currently, local authorities buy 70 per cent of all domiciliary care, and more than 97 per cent of
domiciliary care is provided by the independent sector, which mainly comprises private for-profit
firms (Pursch and Isden, 2018). Given the high proportion of small and micro firms across the
sector, trade union branches have to weigh up the costs and benefits of organising workplace by
workplace, where in each instance only a handful of members may be gained, many of whom may
join primarily for casework support rather than the prospect of engaging in collective action
(Waddington and Kerr, 2009). Across the UK domiciliary care market, there are around 9000
registered providers, two-fifths of which are small and medium enterprises (20 staff or fewer).
There is also significant ‘churn’ in the market, with close to 1500 registrations and de-registrations
each year (Pursch and Isden, 2018), as well as significant workforce turnover. At any one time
more than 112,000 posts are estimated to be vacant in social care, equivalent to 7.2 per cent of the
total. At the same time, around 430,000 workers leave their job each year, which equates to a
turnover rate of over 30 per cent (Skills for Care, 2020).
The moral and social duty that individual care workers often feel to protect the needs of
vulnerable clients may also preclude strike action (Murphy and Turner, 2014), and efforts to foster
the shared interests and identity necessary to build collective efficacy (Kelly, 1998) may be
impeded by the fragmented and isolated nature of the workforce. Care workers often work alone
or in pairs and travel between their own home and those of clients, and rarely visit their employer’s
office, particularly in rural areas. A particular challenge for mobilisation in the domiciliary care
sector is that of identifying a ‘significant other’ to whom blame can be attributed as the source of
injustices. Without this focus the basis for collective action may be compromised. As Rubery
(2015) argues, the fragmentation of employment systems through outsourcing and subcontracting
often means that the ‘true’ employer is obscured. This attribution problem arises in domiciliary
care because of the complex nature of the relationships between central government (who sets the
overall funding parameters for domiciliary care), local authority commissioners (who actually
purchase care from the private sector), and private sector providers (operating under strong cost
competition). The tight financial constraints imposed by central government have effectively
forced local authorities to impose on providers a time-and-task model of commissioning, which
results in a neo-Taylorist model of employment marked by low wages, job insecurity and episodic
working that does not reward discretionary effort (Atkinson and Crozier, 2020; Hebson et al.,
2015; Moore and Hayes, 2017). In this context, it is unclear who is really responsible for the
injustice (for example, low pay, long hours and insecure contracts) and therefore who should be the
target of mobilisations, such as strike action.
New repertoires of contention
These entrenched challenges in precarious and gendered industries have prompted a range of
responses within the trade union movement. Larger unions have made concerted efforts to fore-
ground issues of gender equality in mobilising efforts (Cullen and Murphy, 2018), and have
attempted to reach out to migrant workers through community networks and activists (Lopes and
Hall, 2015). A debate has also arisen around the appropriate structures and strategies needed to
successfully build representative capacity among highly precarious workers, such as those in the
gig economy. Smaller unions, such as the Independent Workers of Great Britain (IWGB), have had
more success in organising, for example, Uber drivers than larger general unions, who have found
themselves pulled between representing gig economy workers, while seeking to denounce and
delegitimise platform companies (Aslam and Woodcock, 2020). Unions have also attempted to
regain lost ground from ‘no-win no-fee’ lawyers by pursuing legal cases on behalf of bogus self-
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employed workers to challenge their exemption from basic protections, such as minimum wages
and holiday pay (Moore and Newsam, 2018; Wynn-Evans, 2021).
Unions have also turned to broader campaigning activities that build public and political
awareness of precariousness in important frontline service roles, such as retail and hospitality
(Murphy and Turner, 2016). This social and community organising is a response to the changing
contours of class relations, shaped by the interplay of workplace and social identities (Moore,
2011), and the development of broader coalitions may also facilitate the emergence of lay leaders
rooted in communities who can often articulate the shared experiences and grievances of highly
marginalised groups, such as migrant workers (Lopes and Hall, 2015; Tapia, 2019). Social cam-
paigns, however, often prioritise the short-term pursuit of ‘winnable issues’, such as payment of a
true living wage, over the long-term objective of capacity building (Bunyan, 2016), and involve the
development of transient alliances with employers, state actors and NGOs in order to secure
concessions for workers (Carver and Doellgast, 2020; Murphy and Turner, 2016). This approach
hinges on the development of coalitional power through public campaigns to compensate for the
loss of traditional institutional and associative power provided by collective bargaining and social
partnership (Connolly et al., 2017).
Unions may also see corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives as potentially an easier
basis on which to start regular negotiations with employers than more substantive workplace issues
(Gold et al., 2020), but short-term concessions made in the name of CSR may merely be window-
dressing and will not be codified in collective agreements (Meardi et al., 2021). There are also
questions about whether top-down campaigns built on fragile alliances between unions, campaign-
ers and employers translate into increased bargaining power and collectivism among low-paid
precarious workers. Furthermore, a largely non-confrontational approach to dealing with work-
place issues may not be sufficient to stimulate the virtuous circle between worker action and
increased worker organisation envisaged by mobilisation theory (Kelly, 1998).
Research context and methods
In this article we explore a novel approach to improving pay and conditions for outsourced workers
in the care sector, led by the United Kingdom’s largest public sector trade union, UNISON. We
explore the development and implementation of the campaign and the accompanying Ethical Care
Charter, as well as the balance between new and traditional repertoires in securing agreement from
national and local policy-makers. We then explore the immediate effects on wages, job security,
and terms and conditions for care workers covered by the Charter, as well as the potential ripple
effect through collective bargaining and any spillover effects into other geographical areas. We
also explore the impact of the campaign and Charter on the recruitment and mobilisation of
outsourced care workers. Our qualitative data are drawn from one case study conducted for an
European Commission-funded six-country study of precarious work in 2015–2016.3 The case
study draws primarily on five interviews with UNISON officials at national, regional and local
level – one of whom was a national officer closely involved in the development and implemen-
tation of the Charter – and gathered feedback from branches on the Charter’s impact on recruitment
and organising. These data are complemented with six interviews with local commissioners (four
3 DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities VP/2014/004, Industrial Relations and Social
Dialogue.
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in the north of England and two in London) and one provider, who offered a grounded perspective
on the practicalities and impact of adopting the Charter.
Findings
In 2012 UNISON launched a nationwide public campaign to highlight the problem of poor care
standards, and low-paid and precarious work in the private sector. A central objective of this
campaign, and the Charter that accompanied it, was to show how the long-term underfunding of
domiciliary care, and the reliance on the private sector to deliver care, had created a highly
fragmented and price-sensitive market, which in turn has eroded the quality of employment and
care. Rather than simply criticising private providers, however, UNISON sought to show how the
time-and-task nature of commissioning by local authorities, adopted in order to stay within strict
financial constraints, has in effect imposed a low-road employment model characterised by low
pay, zero-hours contracts and limited career prospects.
UNISON released a report in 2012 entitled Time to care, which was intended to be a rallying cry
for organisers and branch officials within the union, as well as to build public pressure on national
and local politicians to take seriously the challenges within domiciliary care. UNISON gathered
survey data from care workers that exposed the normalisation of low pay and zero-hours contracts
across the sector; 58 per cent of respondents also reported not being paid for time spent travelling
between client visits. Paying providers only for contact time resulted in ‘call cramming’, whereby
multiple visits lasting sometimes as little as five minutes are scheduled within a short time. This
practice often results either in clients’ needs being unmet, or in care staff working unrecorded
overtime in order to provide the personal care and social contact that clients require. This research
evidence crystallised the challenges faced by care workers, and identified a number of areas in
which pressure could be put on national and local government to act.
Campaigning and coalition-building
National officers within UNISON recognised that care workers had long been neglected, and that
the onset of ‘austerity’ policies in 2010 had inevitably increased the focus on protecting existing
local government standards. Rather than pushing for extensions of existing collective agreements
or insourcing of services, the focus of the Charter was on winnable issues identified by the
research, such as payment of the true living wage, payment for travel time and a move away from
zero-hours contracts. These employment conditions were linked with the commissioning of longer
minimum visits to allow for higher quality interactions between care workers and clients, and a
broader commitment among local authorities and providers to training and development, which, it
was hoped, would raise the status of the profession and help care workers to build sustainable
careers. The Charter was seen by UNISON as a pragmatic approach to raising standards at a time
when the union nationally had limited resources to launch strategic organising drives, and local
branches were dealing with significant local cuts as a result of austerity.
Crucially, the campaign and the Charter were also a way for UNISON to build new alliances
and coalitions with employers, commissioners, service users and the public in order to increase
pressure on central government to address the funding shortfall for local authorities. UNISON
found unlikely allies in two employers’ representative bodies: the Local Government Association
(LGA), which represents 350 local authorities in England, Scotland and Wales, and the home care
provider’s representative body, the UK Home Care Association (UKHCA).
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Since the onset of financial austerity in early 2010, the LGA has consistently and publicly raised
significant concerns about the steady withdrawal of central government grants, and the increasing
pressure on locally collected property taxes as a result of an ageing population and rising demand
for services. For example, the LGA has estimated that adult social care could account for nearly 60
per cent of locally collected taxes by 2030 (up from less than 40 per cent in 2018) and the gap
between projected spending needs and current budgets could reach £18bn per year. The LGA has
also raised concerns about the financial viability of individual local authorities as a result of
sustained downward pressure on budgets, and recognises that many councils do not pay ‘fair fees’
to private providers of care services.
In a similar vein to the LGA, the UKHCA has long been lobbying central and local government for
increased funding, and has argued that contracts are becoming increasingly unviable for their mem-
bers, because of the low rates paid by local authorities, which make it difficult to recruit and retain staff.
The UKHCA developed a formula for domiciliary care fees which allows for staff costs and overheads.
It estimated that as of April 2020 the minimum hourly rate needed to provide good quality domiciliary
care with allowances for staff training and travel time was £20.69. However, fewer than 15 per cent of
local authorities are thought to pay the minimum recommended amount, which undermines providers’
ability to offer safe and stable services, and to comply with legal requirements, such as the statutory
minimum wage (UKHCA, 2018). The UKHCA’s priorities appear to be oriented as much towards
business viability as towards improving working conditions, but evidence suggests that 66 per cent of
local authorities have reported one or more providers either going into administration or handing
contracts back (Women’s Budget Group, 2018).
The LGA and the UKHCA have also worked in tandem to highlight concerns about under-
funding. For example the government policy, announced in June 2015, of rebranding the statutory
national minimum wage as the National Living Wage in April 2016, with an expressed ambition to
reach at least 60 per cent of median earnings by 2020 (up from around 54 per cent in 2015) led to a
joint briefing by the LGA and the UKHCA. In this briefing the parties argued that this higher
minimum wage would, without significant additional investment, lead to a potentially ‘cata-
strophic failure’ of the care system (LGA, 2015). In response, central government provided some
‘transitional funding’ to offset the impact of further cuts in revenue budgets, but the chair of the
LGA, Lord Porter, acknowledged that any extra cost pressures, whether from rising demand or
policies such as the National Living Wage, would have to be funded by councils making cuts
elsewhere.
The main objective of the campaign, from the trade union perspective, was to place precarious
work in the care sector firmly on the political and policy agenda, and in particular to draw attention
to the growing issue of zero-hours contracts. UNISON formally gave evidence to parliamentary
commissions over the use of zero-hours contracts in domiciliary care4 and also at the UK Labour
Party’s national conference. UNISON’s campaigning also tied in with a number of other trade
union campaigns around zero-hours contracts in retail and logistics.
Strengthening local partnerships
Tackling problems of low pay and precarious work clearly requires public sector commissioners to
invest in public supply chains. On its own this may be insufficient and there is also a need to codify
4 https://www.parliament.uk/external/committees/commons-select/communities-and-local-government-
committee/archived-news-2015/news/2017/adult-social-care-full-report-published-16-17/ (accessed 17 March
2021).
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higher workforce standards in contracts in order to prevent providers from simply drawing higher
management overheads and profits from increased fees, a particular risk where the increases are
confined to individual local authorities, as national chains may be willing to raise pay in only some
areas (Grimshaw et al., 2015). National officers within UNISON advised and supported local
branches to apply pressure to individual local authorities in order to improve commissioning
practices through the adoption of a voluntary Ethical Care Charter (ECC). The aim of the Charter
was to leverage existing relationships between branch officials and local authority commissioners
and sympathetic politicians, while also creating space for activists to reach out to care workers in
the private sector. Although social care is funded from general taxation, it is actually commis-
sioned and contracted by 206 individual local commissioning bodies in England, Scotland and
Wales. These bodies are a mixture of unitary and county councils working with local health
services (Clinical Commissioning Groups in England and Integration Joint Boards in Scotland).
Through the Ethical Care Charter, UNISON branches aimed to impress upon local decision-
makers the negative consequences of cost competition and fragmentation, while also providing
a practical mechanism through which standards could be improved.
In order to launch the Charter, UNISON national officers attended regional and local meetings
to raise awareness of the national campaign, and to offer advice and guidance on how to launch
local campaigns. Local branch officials used their existing relationships formally to request meet-
ings with commissioners and politicians to discuss revising and restructuring contracts to embed
higher standards. Activists and organisers also used public meetings to ask politicians difficult
questions about the quality of care provided to elderly residents and the low-paid and insecure
work that local authorities were creating through ‘low-road’ contracting.
The Ethical Care Charter is organised into three stages, aligned with the commissioning pro-
cess. The first stage refers to the basic principle of meeting clients’ needs rather than ‘time-and-
task’ contracting, and sets out a commitment to avoiding 15 minute visits (or shorter) and ‘call
cramming’. The second stage emphasises continuity of care by recommending that clients have the
same care worker (where possible) and clear procedures for handling complaints. The final stage
makes an explicit recommendation that councils commit resources to providing a true living wage
and an occupational sick pay scheme for contracted staff. Although the union remains fundamen-
tally opposed to the fragmentation of public services through outsourcing, the Charter was
designed both to raise the profile of historically underpaid and undervalued care workers, while
also putting pressure on local authorities to take responsibility for securing decent working con-
ditions throughout their externally contracted workforce.
The key points of the Charter from an employment perspective were:
– workers should be paid for travel time between visits;
– zero-hours contracts should not to be used in place of guaranteed hours contracts; and
– all domiciliary care workers should receive a true living wage
In many cases this required local authorities to redesign contracts and to move away from spot
contracts back to block contracts that guarantee providers a reliable number of hours for each
provider, which enable them to offer guaranteed hours contracts to staff. At a local level the
Charter has helped to deliver an increase in hourly rates of pay (up to a true living wage) and has
increased overall earnings as a result of paid travel time and guaranteed hours contracts.
By 2020, 46 out of a total of 206 commissioning authorities in England, Scotland and Wales had
signed up to the Charter, with most signifying they would adopt it in its entirety (a small number of
providers also signed the Charter independently of their local authority). This suggests steady
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progress in terms of persuading local politicians and commissioners to adopt high-road contracting
practices. In the three local authority areas we studied, the decision to adopt the Ethical Care
Charter was driven by the need to shore up local markets and guarantee revenue streams for
providers as much as the moral imperative to protect workers or service users. Block contracts
allow providers to offer guaranteed hours contracts with higher rates of pay, including travel time,
which formerly was considered to be unpaid ‘downtime’ (Moore and Hayes, 2017). Reverting to
block contracts, however, creates more scope for larger firms to dominate local markets, which
creates a risk that management and administration fees will be creamed off from higher charge
rates (Grimshaw et al., 2015). Furthermore, even large providers in higher-fee areas still struggle to
recruit and retain staff, and local authorities often rely on spot purchasing from providers that may
not formally have signed the Ethical Care Charter. The use of electronic monitoring also remains
contentious. On the one hand, it appears axiomatic that this micro-management of the labour
process is incompatible with the notion of ethical care and high quality human resource manage-
ment (Moore and Hayes, 2017). On the other hand, local authorities argue that it allows them to
check that workers have actually been paid for the hours they have worked and that visits are
longer than 15 minutes.
Ripple and spillover effects
Small changes in hourly wages alone are unlikely to solve issues of recruitment and retention.
Nevertheless, the Charter, where fully implemented, did enhance the overall remuneration package
through higher wages, increased security of hours, and efforts to professionalise care work. Com-
missioners in London argued that the Charter did have a positive effect in helping to make careers
in social care more attractive to younger people, and by working with schools and colleges to
promote training and development pathways, the local authority had been able to recruit locally to
fill vacant posts. In other parts of England (particularly rural areas), however, recruitment and
retention remain a significant problem. Some providers that signed the Ethical Care Charter were
still experiencing significant difficulties in scaling up their workforce, which in turn meant that the
local authority commissioners relied on spot contracts to fill gaps in provision. In 2019–2020 (prior
to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic) turnover rates among domiciliary care workers were
close to 40 per cent and vacancy rates were 8.2 per cent and increasing sharply for registered
manager roles (Skills for Care, 2020). Care work remains a low-paid and demanding sector,
particularly when many supermarkets offer living wage jobs with fewer physical and emotional
pressures.
Furthermore, although increases in the UK statutory minimum wage have benefited those at the
very bottom of the wage distribution, the share of workers paid at the statutory minimum has
doubled in three years (from 10 to 20 per cent), and the wage differentials for senior care workers
and for those with several years’ experience have also decreased since 2016 (Skills for Care, 2020).
Similarly, it does not appear that zero-hours contracts have been displaced as the default employ-
ment model in domiciliary care providers across England. According to the most recent available
figures for the private sector (Skills for Care, 2020), 56 per cent of domiciliary care workers were
on zero-hours contracts and this share has remained relatively stable in recent years.
It appears that the ripple and spillover effects of the Charter have been somewhat mixed. For
example, in Scotland, UNISON’s campaign and Charter were significant contributing factors to
the development of plans for a sector-wide living wage agreement for local government and
outsourced care workers (Baluch, 2020). On the other hand, in England, the incorporation of the
living wage into localised agreements that cover mainly private sector contractors has not provided
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a strong platform for coordinated bargaining across the care workforce. The National Joint Council
for local authority services agreement (known as the ‘Green Book’) covers only directly employed
care workers, who make up less than 10 per cent of the total workforce, and while the Charter has
successfully established links between individual councils and their providers, the unions have
faced difficulty in persuading councils to take collective responsibility for outsourced workers:
the local government employers would just say it’s nothing to do with us [ . . . ] they’re outsourced [ . . . ]
(UNISON national official)
Most councils, including those that have signed the Charter, are still not paying a fair market
price, according to the UKHCA’s calculations (UKHCA, 2019), which may encourage providers to
claw back higher minimum hourly wage costs by reducing unsocial hours premiums and allowing
wage differentials between frontline and managerial jobs to narrow. While this may undermine the
long-term career paths of care workers who wish to progress into higher-paying roles, commis-
sioners were reluctant to hand over fees that were not allocated directly to care workers and might
be used to subsidise management salaries:
I understand a differential in a care home where your cleaner now ends up being paid the same as the
care staff [ . . . ] but if you’re paying your area manager £70,000 a year, that’s nothing to do with me
[ . . . ] (Local authority commissioner)
There is also the issue of the internal segmentation of the workforce in larger providers, at which
higher charge rates in one area are not used to cross-subsidise lower rates in another. Providers saw
differences between council rates as being akin to ‘natural’ variations in the market, linked with the
higher cost of living in some areas:
why should support workers in [Council X] be penalised because [Council Y] pay crap rates? (Care
provider)
In the absence of coordinated collective bargaining across public and private sector employers,
pay increases tend to remain localised in response to commissioning priorities and labour market
pressures rather than more general concerns about low pay.
Sustaining the momentum
The Charter was intended to create a space for ongoing dialogue between local union branches and
commissioners over the monitoring and enforcement of key standards, such as the living wage,
while also acting as a ‘foot in the door’ when engaging with private providers. Feedback gathered
from branches that have adopted the Charter indicates that the monitoring of the new contract
arrangements was variable, and in many cases the trade unions were not formally involved in
auditing or scrutinising standards. Furthermore, without the underlying membership base among
private sector contractors, there were few mechanisms by which non-compliance could be iden-
tified independently. Local commissioners argued that reducing the number of contractors as part
of a block contract helped to build stronger relationships with individual providers, but also
recognised that they had to trust providers to comply voluntarily with the standards laid down
in the Charter as they often did not have the capacity to inspect or audit private providers
proactively.
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Branches also offered free training to providers to help care workers obtain new qualifica-
tions (the Care Certificate). Few providers to date have taken up the offer of training,
however, and local commissioners cannot compel suppliers to recognise trade unions, thus
leaving local organising efforts at something of an impasse. Although some local activists and
organisers had been able to recruit individual workers who work at sites providing sheltered
accommodation, where it is more feasible to make contact than when care is in individual
private homes, this has not allowed branch officials to move ‘upstream’ to discuss recognition
agreements with managers and owners of care services. Feedback gathered from branches that
have adopted the Charter suggests that it had been more effective at driving ‘in-fill’ recruit-
ment among the remaining directly employed care workers rather than among outsourced
workers, given that providers were often still suspicious, if not openly hostile, towards trade
unions:
we don’t even know half of the new providers and we’ve got to try to persuade some of them who may
not be naturally minded to let us in [ . . . ] (UNISON branch official)
While the Charter itself may not have directly led to significant organising or mobilising,
there have been localised examples of legal challenges and strike action among private sector
care workers, led by both established trade unions and new smaller unions. UNISON sup-
ported 17 private sector home care workers in London in a legal dispute over non-payment of
the minimum wage because workers were not being paid for travel time.5 Around 120 UNI-
SON care workers took strike action – totalling more than 60 days – in 2014 over a 35 per
cent pay cut imposed by their new employer Care UK after it had taken over the contract
from the health service. This was one of the longest UK industrial disputes in recent times,
and certainly one of the longest among care workers. It led eventually to the employer
agreeing a 2 per cent pay increase for all staff, and a non-consolidated cash payment of
£500 for those transferring from the NHS. More recently, residential care workers walked
out at a residential care facility (run by a non-profit trust) in north London in early 2021 in a
dispute over pay and conditions, and claims of discrimination and harassment by management
since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. The employer has so far failed voluntarily to
recognise the United Voices of the World (UVW) union which, despite being a relatively
small ‘new’ union, has successfully organised workers at one large nursing home. A decision
by the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC)6 in January 2021 accepted the union’s claim that
the establishment of a bargaining unit would achieve a 55 per cent majority membership, and
therefore the employer should recognise the union under the transposed European Information
and Consultation (I&C) Directive (2002/14/EC) which would create the basis for collective
bargaining in future (although as of February 2021 the employer had yet to formally respond
to this judgment). In common with other organising efforts among outsourced workers in
London, it appears that smaller unions (such as the UVW) with stronger links to migrant
communities have made headway in deep organising and mobilising one workplace at a time,
compared with the broad and shallow approach of the larger general unions (Alberti and Però,
2018).
5 https://www.unison.org.uk/news/press-release/2016/09/unisons-biggest-ever-homecare-legal-case-over-
workers-paid-as-little-as-3-27-an-hour/ (accessed 17 March 2021).




This article has analysed the successes and limitations of UNISON’s Ethical Care Campaign and
Charter as an example of a novel solution to poor pay and conditions among the outsourced
domiciliary care workforce. In doing so, the article contributes to the growing literature on trade
union experimentation with new repertoires of action aimed at delivering on ‘winnable issues’
rather than long-term capacity building (Bunyan, 2016; Carver and Doellgast, 2020; Gold et al.,
2020). Similar to other social campaigns in the United States and Europe, which have focused on
exposing low pay and precarious work among outsourced workers (Connolly et al., 2017; Crosby,
2009; Murphy and Turner, 2016), the UNISON Ethical Care Campaign shamed the clients at the
head of supply chains as much as direct employers, who in this case were state actors. The
campaign firmly placed the issues of precarious work and zero-hours contracts on the national
political agenda, and, alongside national employer representatives, UNISON sought to put pressure
on central government as the funder of care services, as well as local authorities as buyers. In turn,
the Ethical Care Charter provided a framework for local union actors to ensure that socially
responsible commissioning processes delivered wage gains for workers and not increased profits
for private contractors (Grimshaw et al., 2015).
Relations with employers, however, are perhaps best described as a transient alignment of
interests as opposed to a formal and enduring coalition. Employers clearly have an interest in
securing additional funding for care services, which in turn may address recruitment and retention
problems, but they are not necessarily driven to improve working conditions based on ethical or
moral concerns. There also remain significant challenges in respect of the resources required for
monitoring and enforcing increasingly complex contracts, and to prevent higher hourly wages from
being recouped by reductions in other terms and conditions. There is also the issue that localised
solutions may contribute to the further fragmentation of standards as gaps open up between rates of
pay across different geographical areas. The positive ripple and spillover effects of wages gains at
the bottom are limited, and even though providers are responsive to localised increases in charge
rates they do not cross-subsidise other areas with lower charge rates. Block contracts have also not
solved the issue of how to recruit and retain staff in domiciliary care when other flexible jobs in
cleaning, retail and hospitality offer broadly similar standards but with less intense physical,
emotional and work-schedule demands.
More importantly there remain unresolved funding problems where local authorities are under
significant financial pressure as a result of sustained efforts to cut budgets. Although pay and
conditions for outsourced workers have improved in those areas that have adopted UNISON’s
Ethical Care Charter, the lack of coordinated upward pressure on wages means there are still cost
incentives to maintain outsourced services. There is also the broader challenge of how to transform
a gendered model of employment at the bottom of the labour market where workers are routinely
exposed to low and variable earnings, and face particular challenges around episodic working and
tight control of work schedules.
Although organising and mobilising care workers were not explicit objectives of the campaign,
the evidence suggests that limited gains have been made in terms of membership among out-
sourced workers, nor have new voices and new leaders emerged from the bottom up. This may
partly reflect the shortcomings of top-down approaches that can disenfranchise workers (McAle-
vey, 2016), but it is also a reflection of the fragmentation of supply chains in sectors such as
domiciliary care and contract cleaning, which obscures proper responsibility for poor pay and
conditions, making it difficult for workers to know who to mobilise against (Connolly et al., 2017;
Rubery, 2015). The strike action at Care UK in 2014 and more recently the London SAGE strike in
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2021 shows that where workers do perceive a significant grievance against their direct employer,
they are willing to engage in sustained collective action to force concessions from management
(Kelly, 1998). The unions’ challenge here is to scale up sporadic action to ensure that local
authorities take greater collective responsibility for outsourced care workers, while at the same
time leveraging the (admittedly fragile) relationships with employers to put pressure on central
government to make sustained investments in local authority care services. Despite the brief
recognition of care workers as ‘heroes’ during the COVID-19 crisis, the entrenched low social
and economic valuation of this highly flexible and feminised occupation continues to foster
chronic underinvestment, low pay and insecurity (UNISON, 2020).
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